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THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF RELIGION ACT:
PROMOTING EQUALITY IN ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Kristen Morgan'
Until September 14, 2004, the Los Angeles County seal depicted ten
symbols reflecting the county's history, one of which was a small cross.1
This cross represented the important role Catholic missionaries played in
the history of the area.2 But in May of 2004, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) sent a letter to the county stating that the cross was an
unconstitutional government endorsement of religion, and threatening
the county with a lawsuit.3 If the ACLU had been successful in its suit, it
could have sought attorneys' fees from the county for tens or even
hundreds of thousands of dollars under a civil rights fee-shifting statute
currently applicable to Establishment Clause cases. Facing the expense
* B.A., The University of Oklahoma; J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University
of America, Columbus School of Law. The author thanks Professor Robert A. Destro for
his guidance in the writing process and her husband Justin Morgan for his ongoing support
and encouragement.
1. See Sue Fox, Officials Vote to Replace County Seal, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, at
B7 [hereinafter Officials Vote to Replace County Seal]. Both the old and new seal were
divided into seven sections. See Sue Fox, FacingSuit, County to Remove Seal's Cross, L.A.
TIMES, June 2, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter FacingSuit] ("The cross-along with a cow, a tuna
fish, a Spanish galleon, the Hollywood Bowl and the Goddess Pomona cradling an armful
of fruit-has adorned the county seal since 1957."); Fox, Officials Vote to Replace County
Seal, supra (depicting the changes made to the seal); L.A. County Online, County of Los
Angeles Official Seal, http://lacounty.info/seal.htm (follow "modified" hyperlink in text)
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (depicting modified seal).
2. For a discussion of this history, see L.A. Avenue, The History of Los Angeles
County, http://www.laavenue.com/LAHistory.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
3. Fox, FacingSuit, supra note 1 ("The American Civil Liberties Union argued that
the official insignia . . . was unconstitutional because it reflects 'an impermissible
endorsement of Christianity by the county government' .... );J. Michael Kennedy,
County Seal Has a Cross the ACLU Can't Bear, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at B3 ("'[W]e
said we would sue them in 14 days, but if they agree to remove the cross we would give
them more time."' (quoting ACLU Executive Director Ramona Ripston)). Notably the
ACLU made no mention of the Pagan Goddess Pomona who adorned the center of the
seal. See Fox, Facing Suit, supra note 1 ("'[Tlhis seal in no way favors the practice or
promotion of any religion over another, just as the Goddess Pomona certainly does not
encourage the act of pagan worship."' (quoting Councilwoman Janice Hahn)). However,
that symbol too was replaced, by the symbol of a "Native American woman holding a
bowl of acorns." Fox, Officials Vote to Replace County Seal, supra note 1; see also
Kennedy, supra (discussing the ACLU's letter to Los Angeles County supervisors).
4. See Fox, Officials Vote to Replace County Seal, supra note 1 (mentioning the
costly nature of potential litigation); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) ("In any action or proceeding
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of litigating the issue, the County reached a settlement with the ACLU in
which the group agreed not to sue if the cross was removed!
Because Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a particularly unsettled
area of law, 6 it is not self-evident that the cross on the Los Angeles
County seal was an unconstitutional government endorsement of
religion But because of the threat of expensive attorneys' fees, the
people of Los Angeles County were deprived of the opportunity to
defend their seal in court. This resulted in an unfair advantage for the
to enforce a provision of [section 1983 and other civil rights statutes] the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs .. "). Section 1983 provides a cause of action for
violations of constitutional rights, including the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see infra Part I.B.1. (discussing the application of
the Establishment Clause to the states through the doctrine of incorporation). Statutes
that provide attorney's fees like this are known as "fee-shifting" statutes. See Daniel L.
Lowery, Comment, "Prevailing Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-Shifting's
Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1441 (1993).
5. See Fox, FacingSuit, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of
Symbolic Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 185 (2004) ("[T]hese [religious]
symbols have given rise to a vast and complicated jurisprudence that, in certain of its
aspects, has been justly criticized as conflicting and incoherent."); Patrick M. Garry, A
CongressionalAttempt to Alleviate the Uncertainty of the Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence: The Public Expression of Religion Act, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006)
("Because of all the different tests used by the courts, and all the different ways in which
those tests have been applied, the current terrain of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
almost impossible to chart with any coherence."); John W. Huleatt, Accommodation or
Endorsement? Stark v. Independent School District.: Caught in the Tangle of Establishment
Clause Chaos, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 657, 657 (1998) ("To say that the Court has had
difficulty identifying and applying the precise principles of the Establishment Clause
would be an understatement .... [R]ecent developments have done little to assist lower
courts seeking guidance from the confounding array of Establishment Clause cases.");
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searchingfor the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
491, 494 (2004) ("During the past half century, constitutional theories of religious freedom
have been in a state of great controversy, perpetual transformation, and consequent
uncertainty.").
7. The U.S. Supreme Court first discussed the unconstitutional "endorsement" of
religion in Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1983). There, the Court held a citysponsored Christmas display that included a nativity scene, did not violate the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 687. The Court has also held that a religious display whose
purpose is "acknowledgement" of our nation's history does not violate the Establishment
Clause. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688 (2005).
8. See Fox, FacingSuit, supra note 1 ("Los Angeles County supervisors... ended an
emotional debate over the symbolism of the tiny gold cross on the county seal by deciding
to remove it rather than defend it against a ...potentially costly court fight [which one
supervisor predicted] 'we are going to lose."'); Fox, Officials Vote to Replace County Seal,
supra note 1 ("[Tlhe Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors stripped a tiny cross from
the county seal ... to avoid a law suit."). Indeed there is evidence both of uncertainty in
the Board's decision to remove the cross, see id. (noting that the decision was approved
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ACLU because it could achieve its desired result without having to
defend its position in open court. 9 This coercive use of the fee-shifting
statute chills even constitutionally protected religious expression because
such expressions are removed so as to avoid the potential litigation costs
to taxpayers rather than because a court held them to be
unconstitutional. 10
Establishment Clause jurisprudence would be more equitable if feeshifting statutes no longer applied to Establishment Clause plaintiffs."
To achieve this equality, the Public Expression of Religion Act (PERA)
was introduced in the U.S. House and Senate.'2
The full title of PERA reveals its core purpose: "[a] bill [t]o amend the
Revised Statutes of the United States to prevent the use of the legal
system in a manner that extorts money from State and local
governments, and the Federal Government, and inhibits such
governments' constitutional actions under the first, tenth, and fourteenth
amendments."' 3 PERA would amend 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to
remove Establishment Clause cases from the purview of the fee-shifting
only by a 3-2 majority), and of public outrage in the Board's decision. See, e.g., Save the
Los Angeles County Seal, http://savetheseal.net/mission.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2008)
(website devoted to opposing the settlement that includes a petition to put the cross back
on the seal); Michael Rich, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2004, at B22 ("The
county seal in no way endorses religion, but it does acknowledge the historical impact that
the California missions had in shaping the culture and makeup of this state and the
county."); Charles Von Sangor, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at B12
(asserting that the ACLU's threat of a lawsuit "represents tyranny by the minority over
the majority").
9. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
10. See Garry, supra note 6, at 2 ("[T]he threat of an attorney's fee award is
particularly chilling because of the highly uncertain and inconsistent status of current
constitutional doctrines governing the Establishment Clause."); 152 CONG. REC. H7390
(daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[C]urrent litigation rules are hostile
to religion because they allow some groups to coerce states and localities into removing
any reference to religion in public places.").
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. Veterans' Memorials, Boy Scouts, Public Seals, and Other Public Expressions of
Religion Protection Act of 2007, S. 415, 110th Cong. (2007); PERA, H.R. 725, 110th Cong.
(2007). Representative John Hostettler (R-IN) originally introduced PERA in the House
on May 26, 2005. 151 CONG. REC. H4139 (daily ed. May 26, 2005); PERA, H.R. 2679,
109th Cong. (2005). It was passed in the house on September 26, 2006, with a vote of 244173. 152 CONG. REC. H7422 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006). Though the original PERA failed
to pass in the Senate, PERA, S. 3696, 109th Cong. (2006), Senator Sam Brownback (RKS) reintroduced PERA on January 29, 2007. 153 CONG. REC. S1283 (daily ed. Jan. 29,
2007). Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) subsequently reintroduced PERA in the
House. 153 CONG. REC. H1053 (daily ed. Jan. 30,2007).
13. S.415; H.R. 725. The title of the original version of PERA was: "A [b]ill [t]o
amend the Revised Statutes of the United States to eliminate the chilling effect on the
constitutionally protected expression of religion by State and local officials that results
from the threat that potential litigants may seek damages and attorney's fees." H.R. 2679.
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statute. 14 This would prevent the coercive use of fee-shifting and
promote fairness in the resolution of constitutional issues. 5 Because
more cases would go to court instead of settling, all parties would be
M
permitted to present their arguments.
This Comment argues that the Public Expression of Religion Act
should be passed because it would restore the vitality of constitutional
public religious expression. In Part I, this Comment discusses the
background and purpose of the civil rights fee-shifting statute and the
background of the Establishment Clause. It next examines the history of
fee-shifting in Establishment Clause cases, showing how fee-shifting has
been used as a tool of coercion and how it fails to serve its intended
purpose in such cases. In Part II, this Comment discusses the purpose of
PERA and the reasons for its introduction in Congress, and examines the
bill's text and legislative history. Part III addresses some of the
objections to PERA and considers how Establishment Clause feeshifting can be distinguished from fee-shifting in other civil rights cases.
Finally, this Comment argues that the enactment of PERA is necessary
to protect constitutional public religious expressions.
I. "ESTABLISHING" THE NEED FOR THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION

PERA
This Comment focuses specifically on legal challenges arising under
the Establishment Clause. 7 However, some Establishment Clause cases
are subject to the federal civil rights fee-shifting statute, and therefore
issues in Establishment Clause litigation are rooted in the development
of fee-shifting and civil rights legislation.
OF RELIGION ACT: THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP FOR

A. Civil Rights, Fee-shifting, and the Establishment Clause
The civil rights fee-shifting statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is
dependent on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,18 which provides a private right of action
for violations of constitutional rights that occur under color of state law."

14. S. 415; H.R. 725.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See S.415; H.R. 725.
18. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
); 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) (2000).
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The statute is dependent on § 1983 because § 1988 provides attorneys'
fees "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] ...
1983. "2 The history and purpose of these statutes can be traced back to
the Reconstruction period following the Civil War."
1. Before fee-shifting: 42 U.S. C. § 1983
Although the civil rights fee-shifting statute was introduced only thirty
years ago,22 § 1983 was enacted in the aftermath of the Civil War."
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (also known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act) 4 to "enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
first section of this act provided a cause of action for civil rights
violations." In 1979, this section was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.27
A pivotal case in the development of § 1983 jurisprudence was Monroe
v. Pape, which the Supreme Court decided in 1961.2 This decision was
significant because it recognized for the first time that an "action could
be 'under color of state law' for purposes of § 1983 even though the state
official acted beyond the scope of her duties and even if the official
contravened state law., 29 In Monroe, the Supreme Court held that the
alleged egregious abuses by the police, which included "ransack[ing]" an
apartment without a warrant and forcing its occupants to stand naked in

20. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). Section 1988 also provides attorney fees in cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981(a), 1982, 1985, 1986, and 13981; the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000; title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Id.
21. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (discussing the history of 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (noting that the civil rights fee-shifting amendment was
enacted in 1976).
23. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172 ("[Section 1983] grew out of a message sent to
Congress by President Grant on March 23, 1871 . .
24. See id. at 171.
25. Id. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce
the provisions of that Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
26. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 ("The first section is one that I believe nobody
objects to, as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States when
they are assailed by any State law or under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying
out the principles of the civil rights bill .... (quoting Senator Edmunds on the first
section of the Act)).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
28. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167; see also Mark R. Brown, Accountability in Government
and Section 1983, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 53, 65 (1991) ("[S]ection 1983 proved fairly
useless until the Supreme Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape.").
29. Brown, supra note 28, at 65 n.47.
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the living room,0 were actionable under § 1983. 3"
In order to understand the type of plaintiff § 1983 sought to protect, it
is useful to consider the history of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. This history
suggests that at least one major purpose of the Act was to restore order
in the Reconstructionist South." In describing what the Civil Rights Act
sought to remedy, one Representative commented: "[M]en were
murdered, houses were burned, women were outraged, men were
scourged, and officers of the law shot down; and the State made no
successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or
redress to the outraged and innocent. 3 3 In Monroe, the Court also
observed that in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress was
concerned with providing a federal right of action in cases where state
courts might fail to protect civil rights. 4
The Court's subsequent decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.
exemplifies the purpose behind Congress' enactment of § 1983 .3 There,
a young white female teacher was denied service at a lunch counter in
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, because she was in the company of six African
American students. 36 She left the store with her students but was
subsequently arrested for vagrancy.37 Thereafter, she sued the store,
alleging that both the refusal of service and the arrest were the product
of a conspiracy to violate her civil rights by officials acting under color of
state law." Here, Adickes' suit under § 1983 served Congress' dual
purposes of eliminating racial discrimination39 and remedying the failure
of southern states to apply federal civil rights law. 40 So as to better effect
Congress' goal, new legislation was passed to make easier the burden
born by plaintiffs bringing civil rights cases.41

30. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
31. Id. at 172.
32. Id. at 172-73 (quoting a message sent by President Grant to Congress discussing
the lawless conditions then existing in the South and recommending that Congress take
actions to remedy this problem).
33. Id. at 175 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., 428 (1871) (quoting Rep.
Beatty of Ohio)).
34. Id. at 180.
35. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
36. Id. at 146.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 147-48.
39. See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93-94 (1989) ("[T]he purpose of § 1988
was to make sure that competent counsel was available to civil rights plaintiffs ...").
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2. Civil Rights Fee-shifting - § 1988
Congress enacted the civil rights fee-shifting statute in 197642 Section
1988(b) provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of section[] ...1983 ...the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs. ' 43 The Supreme Court has stated that
the purpose of this statute is to "ensure 'effective access to the judicial
process' for persons with civil rights grievances. '' 44
With respect to attorneys' fees, the "American rule" generally
provides that they are not recoverable by the prevailing party.45 This rule
was affirmed by the Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society.4 There, the Court considered the "private attorney general"
exception to the general rule barring recovery of attorney's fees and
concluded that exceptions to the ordinary "American rule" against feeshifting have generally been statutory.47 Justice White, writing for the
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
43. Id.
44. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 95 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429
(1983)).
45. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("In
the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable
attorneys' fee from the loser."); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974)
("The so-called 'American Rule' governing the award of attorneys' fees in litigation in the
federal courts is that attorneys' fees 'are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a
statute or enforceable contract providing therefore."' (quoting Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)); see also Michael Kao, Calculating
Lawyers' Fees: Theory and Reality, 51 UCLA L. REV. 825, 826 (2004) ("In the United
States, courts usually do not award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in civil cases.
Instead, each party must pay its own legal fees." (citation omitted)); John F. Vargo, The
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993) ("In the United States, the losing party does not generally
pay the winner's legal fees. Each party is only obligated to pay his or her own attorney's
fees, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.").
46. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 240.
47. See id. at 247 ("At common law, costs were not allowed; but for centuries in
England there has been statutory authorization to award costs, including attorneys'
fees."); id. at 249 ("In 1796, this Court appears to have ruled that the Judiciary itself would
not create a general rule, independent of any statute, allowing awards of attorneys fees in
federal courts.").
There are several exceptions to the general rule prohibiting a prevailing party from
recovering attorney's fees. First, where "the trustee of a fund or property, or a party
preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, [costs,
including attorneys' fees, may be recovered] from the fund or property itself or directly
from the other parties enjoying the benefit." Id. at 257. Second, "a court may assess
attorneys' fees for the 'willful disobedience of a court order ... as part of the fine to be
levied on the defendant,' or when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vetiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons .. " Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted). Additionally,
"'[i]n an ordinary diversity case where the state law does not run counter to a valid federal
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majority, concluded that Congress had not "extended any roving
authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise
whenever the courts might deem them warranted," but rather had made
"specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees
48
under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.,
This "scheme" made it "apparent that the circumstances under which
attorneys' fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the
49
courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to determine.
Indeed, the Court noted that to adopt fee-shifting in this case would
open the door to "a wide range of statutes [that] would arguably satisfy
the criterion of public importance and justify an award of attorneys' fees
to the private litigant."5 ° And, were this the case, "if any statutory policy
is deemed so important that its enforcement must be encouraged by
awards of attorneys' fees, how could a court deny attorneys' fees to
private litigants in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? "51
Congress
responded to the Court's statement by enacting the civil rights feeshifting statute that would award fees to private litigants who brought
successful claims under § 1983.12 The civil rights fee-shifting statute
simply provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party ... a reasonable attorney's fee."53 The statute leaves unanswered a
question first posed by Justice White in his majority opinion in Alyeska
Pipeline:4 who is considered a prevailing party?
Before answering this question, it is necessary to understand what
parties may be involved in civil rights litigation. One party is the plaintiff
statute or rule of court .... state law denying the right to attorneys' fees or giving a right
thereto ... should be followed.' . . . The same would clearly hold for a judicially created
rule ..
" Id. at 259 n.31 (quoting 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 54.77[2], 1712-13
(2d ed. 1974)).
48. Id. at 260-62 (citing antitrust statutes, patent law, and Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, among others, as examples of statutes allowing attorney's fees).
49. Id. at 262. The Court noted that under many of the statutes allowing for
attorney's fees, Congress has "rel[ied] heavily on private enforcement" and provided
attorney's fees in order to "encourage private litigation." Id. at 263. However:
[Congress' adoption of the] private-attorney-general concept can in no sense be
construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule
against nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party and to award attorneys'
fees whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute
important enough to warrant the award.
Id.
50. Id. at 264.
51. Id. (emphasis omitted).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
53. Id.
54. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 264 ("Moreover, should courts, [be permitted to determine
when an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate], opt for awards to the prevailing party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, or only to the prevailing plaintiff?").
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or plaintiffs who bring the civil rights claim.5 A second party is the
defendant, which in § 1983 cases must be a government entity, a state
actor, or an individual acting in a conspiracy with a state actor." An
intervening party might also be involved17 as either a plaintiff or a
defendant. 8
Commonly, a prevailing party under § 1988 is a plaintiff who has
brought a successful constitutional claim. 9 However, others may also be
considered candidates for attorneys' fees as prevailing parties: The
language of the statute excludes the United States from being awarded
attorneys' fees, 6 but a court may award fees to prevailing "state-funded
entities."62 Also, although a court may award an intervening party fees if
55. A plaintiff could be an individual, a class of people, an organization, or some
combination of the three. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573, 587-88 (1989) (organization and individuals challenging constitutionality of city
holiday display); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1987) (public school children, a
teacher, and several parents challenging constitutionality of "minute of silence" in school);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983) (taxpayers challenging constitutionality of a tax
deduction).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a cause of action against any person who
deprives another of his rights "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia").
57. FED. R. CIv. P. 19, 24. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, intervention
may be either permissive or "of right." FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. The Federal Rules allow a person to be joined as a party if in
their absence "complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties" or if
the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the
claimed interest.
Id. at 19(a). This rule also provides that "[i]f the person should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff." Id.
59. See, e.g., Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 823-24 (5th Cir. 1999)
affd 530 U.S. 290 (2000) ("Under § 1988, the district court may make an award of
attorney's fees only if it determines that the claimant is a 'prevailing party."' (emphasis
added)); Moeller v. Bradford County, 444 F. Supp. 2d 316, 328 (M.D. Pa. 2006) ("It is
clear that a Plaintiff, who wins only nominal damages in his § 1983 action, is still entitled to
attorneys' fees.").
60. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs. ..

."

(emphasis added)).

62. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 n.31 (1982)
("Appellants ... challenge the Court of Appeals' award of attorney's fees to the School
District plaintiffs arguing that state-funded entities are not eligible to receive such awards
from the State. . . . Nothing in the history of the statutes suggests that [the language
barring the United States from collecting attorney's fees as a prevailing party] was meant
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"the intervenor plays a significant role in the litigation,"63 Congress did
not intend "such an award be as nearly automatic as it is for a party
prevailing in its own right. "6
Where the defendant is the prevailing party, they can only be awarded
attorneys' fees under § 1988 if "the plaintiff's action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in
subjective bad faith."65 On the other hand, a prevailing plaintiff "should
ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust." 66 Although defendant-intervenors are not
precluded from recovering attorneys' fees,67 they are usually6 required to
make the same showing of frivolity as a prevailing defendant. 1
3. The Problem: Fee-Shifting and the Establishment Clause
Fee-shifting in Establishment Clause cases is problematic because it
prevents the difficult issues surrounding public expression of religion
from being determined in full and public proceedings. 69 There are
numerous examples of local governments surrendering their right to
defend themselves in court out of fear of expensive litigation.70 This
to exclude state-funded entities. To the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have held with
substantial unanimity that publicly funded legal services organizations may be awarded
fees." (citation omitted)).
63. Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985).
64. ECOS, Inc. v. Brinegar, 671 F. Supp. 381,387 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
65. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434
U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
66. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
67. For an example of a case in which a court awarded attorney's fees to a defendantintervenor, see Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850-51 (Mich. 1980) (finding
defendant-recovery rule did not apply because defendant-intervenors were seeking to
enforce their own civil rights).
68. See id. at 850 ("Thus, a defendant who is victorious should ordinarily not be
allowed to collect attorneys' fees unless the suit brought against him was baseless.").
69. See generally 152 CONG. REC. H7389 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Smith) ("[The Act will] eliminate the chilling effect on the constitutionally protected
expression of religion by state and local officials that results from the threat that potential
litigants may seek damages and attorney's fees ...").
70. See Garry, supra note 6, at 6-7 ("Because of the varying tests the Court applies in
its respective Establishment Clause cases, and because of the subjective ways in which
those tests have been applied, it is reasonable to conclude that governmental entities,
fearing an award of attorney's fees against them, would simply play it safe and forbid any
kind of religious expression that might somehow be subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge."); see also 152 CONG. REC. H7390 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Smith) ("[L]ocal governments are being forced to accede to the demands of those seeking
to remove religious words or tear down symbols, and ban religious people from using the
public square, even when allowing those uses might, in fact, be constitutional."). In
Redlands County, California, for example, the county agreed to remove a small cross from
its county seal as part of a settlement with the ACLU. Kennedy, supra note 3. Similarly,
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phenomenon is especially troubling because Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is such an unsettled area of law.7
B. The Root of the Issue: An Overview of Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting
7 2 an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
1. The Application of the EstablishmentClause to the States
At the time of its ratification, the Establishment Clause applied only to
the federal government, 73 but it has since been applied to state and local

in Indiana, the Indiana Civil Liberties Union sent a letter to all the public school teachers
within the state, stating that the ICLU would sue any teacher who supported a prayer at
graduation, that the ICLU would win, and that it would seek attorney's fees. 152 CONG.
REC. H7389, 7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler). In his
discussion of this case, Representative Hostettler stated, "these threats to teachers, who
are highly unlikely to be able to pay their own attorneys fees let alone the exorbitant
attorneys fees of the ICLU, make it very likely educators would capitulate to the ICLU
before even checking to make sure the ICLU has their facts right." Id.; see also supra
notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 6.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment was ratified in 1791 as part of the
Bill of Rights. Matthew Spalding, The Formation of the Constitution, in THE HERITAGE
GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 7, 10 (Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte & Matthew
Spalding eds., 2005). Whether the Constitution should include a Bill of Rights was a
contentious issue at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. See id. Anti-Federalists, such
as George Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, refused to sign the
Constitution because it did not include a Bill of Rights. See id. To avoid alienating the
Anti-Federalists, the framers of the Constitution promised to add a bill of rights. See id.
73. See John Baker, Establishment of Religion, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 302, 303. The drafting history of the amendment
illustrates that the founders changed the language of the Establishment Clause because of
concern that it would be read to apply to the states. Id. ("In the First Congress, the
committee proposal in the House read, 'no religion shall be established by law, nor shall
the equal rights of conscience be infringed.' But some evinced concern that the phrase
might put in doubt the legitimacy of some of the states' own religious establishments.").
Thomas Jefferson, most often cited in this context for the phrase "separation of church
and state," see, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall
of separation between church and State."'), recognized that the First Amendment was a
limitation on the federal ("general") United States government. DAVID BARTON,
ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION 24-25 (3d ed. 2004)

(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 4 THOMAS
JEFFERSON, MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF

THOMAS JEFFERSON 103-04 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1830)).
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governments as well.74 Using the doctrine of incorporation,75 the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has rendered
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact ...
law[s] respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the exercise
thereof." 6
This rule was subsequently affirmed by the Court in Everson v. Board
of Education of Ewing Township.77 There, a New Jersey statute
authorized local school districts to "make rules and contracts for the
transportation of children to and from schools., 78 Acting pursuant to this
statute, Ewing Township authorized reimbursements to parents for
money expended on public transportation to school.79 Some of these
reimbursements went to parents who sent their children to Catholic
parochial schools.
A New Jersey taxpayer brought suit against the township, arguing that
the statute supported religious schools, and therefore was an

74.

See infra notes 76-109 and accompanying text.

75.

See CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE

AND RECONSTRUCTION 557 (2d ed. 2003) ("Beginning [in 1897], the Court. began
incorporating the various Bill of Rights provisions into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897)). The doctrine of incorporation provides that "those portions of the Bill
of Rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' those matters 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' [are] part of the
'due process' limiting state power." Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
76. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). In Cantwell, the Court first
applied the First Amendment Free Exercise clause to the states. Id. There, appellants,
who were Jehovah's Witnesses, were arrested for "inciting a breach of the peace," by
going door to door distributing religious materials and soliciting donations. Id. at 300-01.
The Supreme Court ruled that the statute under which the appellants were convicted
"deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 303. Because the Fourteenth Amendment "embraces"
the First Amendment, the Court ruled that the statute deprived the appellants' liberty by
impeding their right to the free exercise of religion. Id. at 303-04.
77. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
78. Id. at 3. The New Jersey Statute read:
When any school district provides any transportation for public school children
to and from school, transportation from any point in such established school
route to any other point in such established school route shall be supplied to
school children residing in such school district in going to and from school other
than a public school, except such school as is operated for profit in whole or in
part.
Id. (citing N.J. Rev. Stat. 18:14-8).
79. Id. (citing N.J. Rev. Stat. 18:14-8).
80. Id.
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The court
unconstitutional government establishment of religion."
found it prudent to take American colonial history into account when
It began with a discussion of
interpreting the First Amendment."
religious persecution in both Europe and the American colonies. 3 It
then explained the subsequent movement to prevent government
establishment of religion, noting that the First Amendment was intended
to prevent the government from compelling citizens to support a
particular church.8
The Everson Court concluded that the Establishment Clause was part
of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and should
therefore apply to the states:
The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier
cases has been accepted by this Court in its decisions
concerning an individual's religious freedom rendered since the
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the
prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging
religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same
application and broad interpretation to the "establishment of
religion" clause.85
As a result, the Court had to decide whether the New Jersey statute
violated the Establishment Clause. 86 It concluded that the statute did not
because it provided only "general State law benefits." '
Four justices dissented from the majority's opinion. Justice Jackson,
joined by Justice Frankfurter, agreed with the majority's advocacy for88
"complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State."
However, Justice Jackson thought that the majority failed to apply this
81. Id. at 3, 5 ("This is alleged to be a use of state power to support church schools
contrary to the prohibition of the First Amendment which the Fourteenth Amendment

made applicable to the states.").
82. Id. at 8 ("[Ilt is not inappropriate briefly to review the background and
environment of the period in which that constitutional language was fashioned and
adopted.").
83. Id. at 8-10 ("These practices became so commonplace as to shock the freedomloving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to pay ministers'
salaries and to build and maintain churches and church property aroused their indignation.
It was these feelings which found expression in the First Amendment.").

84. Id. at 11-13 (comparing the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to the
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty).

85. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 16.
87. Id. at 16-17 ("[W]e cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey
from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a
general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other

schools.").
88.

Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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principle." He concluded that the statute violated the Establishment
Clause because it provided transportation reimbursements on the basis
of religious beliefs.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, concluded that the New Jersey statute
was an unconstitutional breach of "the wall raised between church and
state."9 Like the majority, Justice Rutledge examined the historical
origins of the First Amendment. 92 He then concluded that the New
Jersey statute effectively taxed citizens for the support of a religion, and
was therefore unconstitutional.93
2. Establishment ClauseJurisprudenceas an Unsettled Area of Law
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a particularly unsettled area of
law.94
The Supreme Court has articulated multiple tests for
Establishment Clause cases since its ruling in Everson, including the
"Lemon Test," the "Endorsement Test," and the "Coercion Test." 95 It
can be difficult to predict which test a court will use and application of
each test can yield different results. 96 It is this difficulty that causes local
governments to surrender the rights of their constituents rather than risk
the cost of expensive litigation.97
Even the test most commonly used, the Lemon test, is less than
certain. The Supreme Court has stated that its factors "serve as 'no more
89. Id. (arguing that the "undertones" of the Court's opinion "seem utterly
discordant with its conclusion").
90. Id. at 24-26.
91. Id. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 33-43.
93. Id. at 44-45.
94. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
95. BARTON, supra note 73, at 189. See generally Garry, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing
the "array of tests to determine whether a particular governmental action constitutes an
establishment of religion"). After noting the variety of tests used by the Court, author
David Barton cites Thomas Jefferson's "warning" that "'[t]he Constitution
...is a mere thing of wax in the hand of the judiciary which they may twist and shape into
any form they please."' Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer
Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in JEFFERSON, supra note 73, at 317). In Lynch v. Donnelly, the
Court stated, "[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any
single test or criterion in this sensitive area." 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
96. See Garry, supra note 6, at 2 ("Over the past several decades, the courts have not
only used an array of different constitutional tests for determining Establishment Clause
violations, but have applied those tests in confusing and inconsistent ways."). Compare
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (finding that the First Amendment permits a
monument of the Ten Commandments) with McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (finding, on the same day, that the First
Amendment prohibits posters of the ten commandments).
97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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than helpful signposts." '9 The Court has also stated that "[tjhe
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has consistently presented
this Court with difficult questions of interpretation and application. We
acknowledged in [Lemon] that 'we can only dimly perceive the lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional
law."'99

For example, in 2005 the Court decided two cases on the same day
involving the public display of the Ten Commandments.' °° These cases
not only had conflicting holdings, but the Court applied different tests in
each case. 1 ' In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court concluded that a
monument displaying the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the
Texas state capitol was not unconstitutional. 2 Before reaching the
primary issue in the case, the Court noted the "two faces" of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "Our institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not press religious
observances upon their citizens. One face looks to the past in
acknowledgment of our Nation's heritage, while the other looks to the
present in demanding a separation between church and state."'0 3
Declining to apply the Lemon test, 04 the Court concluded that the
display was a constitutional "passive" acknowledgement of the "role of
God in our Nation's heritage."'0 5
That same day, the Court ruled that a Ten Commandments display in
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky was an
unconstitutional establishment of religion.0 4 McCreary involved posters
of the Ten Commandments displayed in two county courthouses.17
After reviewing the facts of the case, the Court focused on the "purpose"
prongs of the Lemon test.'0 8 It then adopted the District Court's finding

98. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
99. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986) (quoting
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)) (citation omitted).
100. See Garry, supra note 6, at 2.
101. See id. at 2-3.
102. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
103. Id. at 683.
104. See Garry, supra note 6, at 2 ("[T]he [Van Orden] plurality opinion did not even
mention what had, up to that time, become the most prominent test for judging public
displays or expressions of religion-the endorsement test-nor did the Court employ the
infamous Lemon test.").
105. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686-87.
106. McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 858 (2005).
107. Id. at 851. The posters also contained excerpts with religious themes from other
documents, including the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of Kentucky, and
a Proclamation by President Lincoln. Id. at 853-54.
108. Id. at 864-66.
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that the displays had a predominantly religious purpose, and concluded
that they were unconstitutional. " As a result of this uncertainty, it is
necessary that Congress act "to prevent a governmental chilling
of free
110
speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment."
C. The Public Expression of Religion Act: A Solution to the Problem?
1. The Intersection of the Establishment Clause and § 1988
Section 1988, one of the civil rights fee-shifting statutes, provides
successful litigants attorneys' fees in Establishment Clause cases. This is
because the fee-shifting statute applies to case brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.111 In Everson, the Court held that the Establishment Clause was
applicable to state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. 112 Section 1983
provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges,
'
or immunities secured by the Constitution."113
Therefore, where
violations of the Establishment Clause are categorized as deprivations of
constitutional rights under § 1983, attorneys' fees may be awarded in
these cases under § 1988.4 The provision of attorneys' fees under § 1988
109. Id. at 858.
110. Garry, supranote 6, at 1.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
112. Everson v. Bd. Of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see also supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
114. Despite the Court's holding that the Establishment Clause is a liberty, the
deprivation of which is actionable under section 1983, many scholars believe the Court's
holding is "indefensible-historically, textually, and practically." Michael Allen Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 314 (1986); see also Daniel 0. Conkle,
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113, 1142
(1988) ("The language of the fourteenth amendment, coupled with the federalistic
motivation for the establishment clause, make it exceedingly difficult to argue that the
framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment intended to incorporate the
establishment clause for application against the states."); Garry, supra note 6, at 5
("Unlike the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which protects a substantive
individual right, the Establishment Clause is a structural clause, governing the relationship
between 'church and state[,]' [therefore] Establishment Clause violations [do] not fit
within the § 1983 emphasis on individual rights violations."); Russell A. Hilton, The Case
for the Selective Disincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Is Everson a SuperPrecedent?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1701, 1706 (2007) ("Insofar as the only Bill of Rights
provisions that are candidates for incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment are
those that guarantee individual rights, the Establishment Clause was never an appropriate
candidate for incorporation."); Paulsen, supra, at 317 ("[T]o the extent that the Framers
drafted the establishment clause to address concerns of federalism, it makes no more sense
to "incorporate" it against the states than it does to incorporate the other provisions in the
Bill of Rights which are federalism-oriented."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 814 n.5 (2d ed. 1988) ("[With respect to] the special
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and the uncertainty in Establishment Clause litigation create an
inequality in the defense of constitutionally protected religious
expressions." 5
2. The Public Expression of Religion Act: A Solution to the Problem?
Representative John Hostettler (R-IN) and Senator Sam Brownback
(R-KS) originally introduced the Public Expression of Religion Act
(PERA) into the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate,
respectively. "6 Representative Hostettler explained the purpose of the
bill during the House debate on PERA, stating that "the mention of
attorneys fees in these kinds of cases were jeopardizing our constituents'
constitutional rights."11 7 Representative Hostettler argued that PERA
would "prevent the mere threats of the legal system to intimidate
communities, States, and groups like the American Legion into relenting
without ever darkening the doorsteps of a Federal courthouse.""'
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR PERA, THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND SOME VIEWS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
PERA is necessary to prevent inequality in the application of the civil
rights fee-shifting statute,. Supporters of the bill argue it will provide
Establishment Clause cases greater access to courtrooms by preventing
plaintiffs from intimidating local governments into avoiding potentially
costly litigation. 9 Additionally, the Establishment Clause occupies a
unique place in the Bill of Rights and can reasonably be distinguished
from other rights for the purpose of the fee-shifting statute.

problems of incorporating the establishment clause. . . [f]irst, some objected-with
historical support-that the absorption of the first amendment's ban against establishment
was conceptually troublesome inasmuch as the Framers intended the establishment clause
to block Congress from disestablishing existing official state churches .... Second, some
had suggested that the 'liberty' guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment could not be
held to encompass the establishment clause because that clause did not protect a
'freedom' of the individual.").
115. See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
116. See 151 CONG. REC. H4139 (daily ed. May 26, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Hostettler); 152 CONG. REC. S8049 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Brownback). The 2007 version of PERA was introduced by Senator Sam Brownback in
the Senate and Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) in the House. See supra note 12.
117. 152 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7356, 7359 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Gingrey) ("[W]e need a balancing of rights. That is what this is all about. Let's level
the playing field. We are not eliminating anybody's constitutional rights under the
establishment clause.").
120. See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Language of PERA: Amending Sections 1983 and 1988
Though the original PERA died in the Senate, an identical version was
reintroduced to the 110th Congress in January, 2007.121 If passed, PERA
would amend two different sections of the U.S. Code in order to prevent
the award of attorney's fees to Establishment Clause plaintiffs. 22 Section
1983 would be amended by adding the following language to a new
subsection (b): "The remedies with respect to a claim under this section
are limited to injunctive and declaratory relief where the deprivation
consists of a violation of a prohibition in the Constitution against the
123 Additionally, the actual feeestablishment of religion shall ...
shifting statute, § 1988, would also be amended by adding the following
language to the end of the section: "However, no fees shall be awarded
under this subsection with respect to a claim described in subsection (b)
of [§ 1983]. ''124
Together, these two changes would make Establishment Clause
jurisprudence more equitable.12 1 Organizations such as the ACLU would
no longer be able to use fee-shifting to pressure governments to remove
room.126
public expressions of religion without stepping foot into a court
Rather, these organizations, in order to accomplish their objectives,
would be forced to take the issue to court, resulting12 in equitable
1
protection for constitutional rights to religious expression.
B. PromotingAccess to the CourtroomAmidst the Confusion
Perhaps the most important argument in favor of PERA is that it
provides greater access to the courts in the unpredictable area of
Establishment Clause litigation.128 Because of the inequality in the

121. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; Press Release, U.S. Senator Sam
Brownback, Brownback Reintroduces Public Expressions of Religion Act (Jan. 29, 2007),
http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=268117.
122. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
123. PERA, S. 415, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007); PERA, H.R. 725, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
(2007).
124.
125.
126.

S. 415 § 2(b); H.R. 725 § 2(b).
See infra Part III.
See supra note 70 (citing examples of local governments surrendering their right

to defend themselves in court).
127. See 152 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Hostettler) ("This legislation would allow establishment clause cases to go to court

unfettered by fear or coercion on the part of the defendant."); see also infra notes 128-39
and accompanying text.
12& See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the unfair advantage

organizations such as the ACLU have in bringing establishment clause suits against state
and local governments).
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S

129

local
defense of constitutionally protected religious expressions,
governments surrender the rights of their constituents rather than risk
the cost of expensive litigation.'o
The confusion surrounding Establishment Clause jurisprudence' is
one of the major reasons PERA supporters argue the legislation is
In his comments on the House floor, PERA sponsor
necessary.'
Representative Hostettler stated that this uncertainty compounded the
other problems created by fee-shifting in the Establishment Clause:
"What makes this even more difficult for States and localities is that the
jurisprudence in establishment clause cases is about as clear as mud.
Different districts and even the Supreme Court itself flip-flops on
issues."' 33 Because of this confusion local governments cannot know
whether their actions will be viewed as constitutional, and thus, cannot
risk the cost of defending themselves in court) 34
For instance, after the Ten Commandments cases in 2005, it could be
difficult to advise a city on what to do if an organization threatens to sue
over a similar religious display.'35 While legal scholars may be able to
distinguish between Van Orden and McCreary, these slight distinctions
cannot help predict how courts will apply these cases to a particular set of
facts. 36 In terms of fiscal responsibility, it is likely the city would be
advised to remove the display rather than risk the expense of litigation
129. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7357 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Gingrey) ("[W]hat is more concerning is when a defendant decides, a city or county like
Barrow and Winder, Georgia, to settle without challenging the frivolous accusations not
because they could not win but because they cannot match the challenger's legal war
chest."); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
132. 152 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
133. Id.; see also supra Part I.B.2.
134. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7356 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Gingrey) ("On July 19, 2005, a month after the Supreme Court ruled on the two Kentucky
Ten Commandments cases, United States District Court Judge William O'Kelley ruled in
my home State of Georgia that the courthouse in Barrow County, my daughter-in-law's
home, had to remove a framed poster of the Ten Commandments and awarded the
American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU, $150,000. Mr. Speaker, small counties like
Barrow cannot afford these costly lawsuits; and my daughter-in-law's parents . . .
experienced an increase in their taxes to help pay for these court costs and the legal
fees.").
135. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005); McCreary County v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850-51 (2005).
136. See 152 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Hostettler) ("In the Van Orden case, the court applied the Marsh test of historical
perspective to determine the Ten Commandments in a public venue was constitutional in
Texas; while the McCreary case used the Lemon test to determine the Ten
Commandments in a public venue in Kentucky was unconstitutional.").
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that could include the plaintiff's attorneys' fees. 37 However, since the
Supreme Court has ruled that at least some Ten Commandments
displays are constitutional, it is possible that the display in this scenario
could be constitutional. 13 The fee-shifting statute therefore has the
indirect effect of suppressing a constitutionally permissible expression of
religion."'
C. Interpretingthe Establishment Clause
In addition to preventing inequality to the application of the civil rights
fee-shifting statute, PERA partially remedies the Supreme Court's
mistaken inclusion of Establishment
Clause violations within § 1983's
• - • 141
emphasis on civil rights violations.
Several noted historians and
scholars have argued that the founding fathers never intended the
Establishment Clause to have the effect it has today.14 The Supreme
Court's incorporation of the Establishment Clause for application to the
states under the Due Process Clause of the• Fourteenth
Amendment
• 1
142
significantly altered Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Framers
143
never intended the Establishment Clause to apply to the states, rather
the clause was intended to focus "on the structural autonomy of...''
governmental institutions from the dictates of a chosen religious sect. 4
In other words, "[tihe Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, not
freedom from religion.' ' 145 By removing the possibility of attorneys' fees
in Establishment Clause litigation, PERA thus properly distinguishes the
137. See supra notes 129-30.
138. See generally Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92 (demonstrating that governments
sometimes prevail).
139. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
140. See Garry, supra note 6, at 4-5; see also supra note 114.
141. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., The Establishment Clause as Intended: No Preference
Among Sects and Pluralism in a Large Commercial Republic, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 41, 42 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr.

ed., 1991) ("Given incorporation of the establishment clause, the Supreme Court's
abandonment of the original understanding of the establishment clause has meant
decisions in the area of religion that have generated tremendous [negative] popular
reaction."); BARTON, supra note 73, at 24 ("The records are succinct; they clearly
document that the Founders' purpose for the First Amendment is not compatible with the
interpretation given it by contemporary courts."); PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH
GOD: THE COURTS' TORTUOUS TREATMENT OF RELIGION 21 (2006) ("[A]pplication of

the establishment clause to the states actually contradicted the very essence of the clause,
completely inverting its original purpose.").
142. See GARRY, supra note 141, at 20; see also supra Part I.B.2.
143.

See Garry, supra note 6, at 5; see also GARRY, supra note 141, at 21.

144. Garry, supra note 6, at 5; see also GARRY, supra 141, at 21 ("[T]he framers meant
[the Establishment Clause] to apply only to the national government, restraining it from
interfering in any matter with individual state policies regarding religion.").
145. 152 CONG. REC. H7357 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Gingrey).
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Establishment Clause from the individual rights encompassed by §
1983.'4
III. LEVELING A MUDDY PLAYING FIELD

Opponents of PERA have advanced two main arguments against the
bill. First, they have argued that PERA would suppress challenges to
government establishment of religion. 14 7 During the House debate on
PERA, several congressmen claimed that the bill "insulates serious
constitutional violations from judicial review,"'4 and "would encourage
elected officials to violate the Establishment Clause whenever they find
it politically advantageous to do so[,] remov[ing] the
threat that exists to
1 49
ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause.
While it is true that PERA would change the operation of the
Establishment Clause, it would in no way create a legal bar to
Establishment Clause cases. 5 ° Plaintiffs would still be able to seek
injunctive and declaratory relief against violations of the Establishment
Clause,"' protecting plaintiffs' rights to be free from unconstitutional

146. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. E1904 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Etheridge) ("By denying the payment of those attorneys' fees, even in successful cases,
[PERA] insulates serious constitutional violations from judicial review ....
By barring
the awarding of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in those cases, [PERA] severely
impairs the ability of our citizens to protect their constitutional rights."); 152 CONG. REC.
E1905 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Maloney) ("[W]hat [PERA] will
actually do is deny citizens from exercising their freedom of religion. Without the ability
to recoup legal fees, the costs to bring a lawsuit against a defendant would be too high for
most people to afford."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Legislating Violations of the Constitution,
Sept. 30, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR20
06092901055.html?sub=AR ("[PERA] has only one purpose: to prevent suits challenging
unconstitutional government actions advancing religion.").
148. 152 CONG. REC. E1904 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Etheridge).
149. 152 CONG. REC. E1879 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Rep. Udall)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from K. Hollyn Hollman, General
Counsel, The Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty (Sept. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-upload-file30l_26756.pdf).
150. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
151. See PERA, S. 415, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007) (proposing changes only for
Establishment Clause litigation); PERA, H.R. 725, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007) (same); 152
CONG. REC. H7390 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[W]hile
Establishment Clause cases can continue to be brought against State and local
governments, they can be brought only for injunctive relief."); see also Garry, supra note
6, at 5 ("[Tjhe remedies awarded in most establishment cases are not money damages to
individuals; instead, the remedies are most often injunctions against the offending
governmental practice or an overturning of a particular law or ordinance.").
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government establishments of religion."' At the same time, those who
support public expressions of religion could defend their views in court."3
Thus, through the judicial system, unconstitutional establishments of
religion would be excised while constitutional public expressions of
religion would be protected.14 As Representative John Hostettler stated,
"if an individual wants a particular activity to stop or a particular display
to be removed, the court can in fact still say that that display must be
removed or that that activity must cease."' 55
PERA's opponents have also claimed that the bill would limit the free
exercise of religion. For example, Representative Jarrold Nadler stated
"we would ... be telling government officials everywhere that Congress
thinks it is okay for them to violate people's religious liberty with
impunity.""'' Representative Mark Udall referred in his objections to a

free speech case, implying that PERA would have changed the outcome
of that case.5 These arguments are unfounded because PERA would
not change the operation of the Free Exercise Clause. 5 9 Free Exercise
Clause plaintiffs could still seek attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.'60
152. See 152 CONG. REC. H7390 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Smith)
("This means that a court can still order that a State official or local government stop
doing whatever was an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.").
153. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Hostettler) ("[Presently], that case could go to court, but it probably would not. Because
those county officials, those officials would have this sword of Damocles hanging over
their head, meaning we are going to take you to court, and when we win, you will have to
pay our attorney's fees as well.").
154. See, e.g., id. ("The Public Expression of Religion Act would make sure these cases
are tried on their merits and are not merely used to extort behavior via settlements outside
our judicial system.").
155. 152 CONG. REC. H7395 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
156. See supranote 147 and accompanying text.
157. 152 CONG. REC. H7391 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006).
158. 152 CONG. REC. E1879 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Rep. Udall) ("For
[an] example of where this might lead, consider the 2003 lawsuit against the school district
in Ann Arbor.... [T]he plaintiffs complained that a former students right to free speech
was abridged when school officials denied the student an opportunity to give her opinion
of homosexuality at a school forum on diversity. The judge ruled [the plaintiffs] were
right, and ordered the school district to pay damages, attorneys' fees and costs .... I have
no reason to think that was an abuse. I am glad that the law provides judges with the
discretion to award attorneys' fees when people successfully defend their constitutional
rights. This bill would limit that discretion unnecessarily ... ").
159. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (explaining that PERA applies to
Establishment clause cases; 152 CONG. REC. H7293 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Hostettler) ("[T]his bill does not address free exercise cases."). See generally PERA,
S. 415, 110th Cong. (2007) (making no mention of Free Exercise Clause cases); PERA,
H.R. 725, 110th Cong. (2007) (same).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). But see 152 CONG. REC. E1904 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
2006) (statement of Rep. Etheridge) ("[T]he Establishment Clause is included in the

20081

Promoting Equality in the Establishment Clause

Those opposing PERA have also argued that, even if plaintiffs will still
be able to bring Establishment Clause cases for injunctive relief, PERA
will prevent economically disadvantaged plaintiffs from seeking such
relief."' But, fee-shifting is unnecessary as a method for guaranteeing
access in Establishment Clause cases. ' 2 During the House debate,
Representative Lamar Smith stated that he was not aware of an
organization "that has said they will not bring a good cause case under
the establishment clause if they can't be awarded attorneys fees."' 63 He
noted that, "[i]n fact, the ACLU has said just the opposite."' 6 PERA's
supporters have also noted that important Establishment Clause cases
were brought before the fee-shifting statute was enacted. ' 65 Although
one opponent stated that PERA would result in mandatory prayer in
school, it seems unlikely that organizations like the ACLU would refuse
to represent plaintiffs in cases involving such clear constitutional
violations.' 66 As Representative Hostettler stated, "A majority of the
cases the ACLU and its affiliates represent are facilitated by staff
attorneys or through pro bono work, so any attorneys fees awarded to
'
On the other hand, PERA will allow
them is icing on the cake."167
greater access to the judiciary to local governments that are currently
Constitution to protect and promote religious freedom for all Americans. [PERA] would
for the first time single out one of the constitutional protections afforded in the Bill of
Rights, and prevent its full enforcement. If the right to attorney's fees is taken away in
these cases, a dangerous precedent would be set for the erosion of more civil liberties
included in the U.S. Constitution.").
161. 152 CONG. REC. H7359 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Edwards)
("It makes it harder, if not impossible, for many citizens to stop the intervention of
government into our religious faith and our lives."); 152 CONG. REC. E1904 (daily ed.
Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Ethridge) ("Few citizens can afford to pay attorney fees
that can total hundreds of thousands of dollars in these cases .... All of the rights in the
Constitution are granted to every citizen of the United States, not just to those who can
afford to pay for them.").
162. See 152 CONG. REC. H7394 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Smith).
163. Id.
164. Id. Rep. Smith also quoted Peter Eliasberg, a staff attorney for the ACLU of
Southern California, as saying "'Money has never been a deciding factor when we take
cases.' ... '[PERA] wouldn't stop us from bringing lawsuits."' Id.
165. 152 CONG. REC. H7362 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler)
("[L]et me remind you that the awards act came in 1976. In 1962, the United States
Supreme Court struck down the notion of school prayer without the attorneys fees award
act. In 1963, the Supreme Court struck down Bible reading in public schools, without the
attorneys fees award act. This bill will simply allow the cases to actually continue to go to
court.").
166. 152 CONG. REC. H7394 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Smith)
(stating that the prohibition of fees in Establishment Clause cases "wouldn't stop [the
ACLU] from bringing lawsuits" (quoting Peter Eliasberg, staff attorney for the ACLU of
Southern California)).
167. 152 CONG. REC. H7393 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler).
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limited in their ability to defend public expressions of religion because of
economic concerns.168
While the civil rights fee-shifting statute, § 1988, was enacted to
provide greater access to the courts for those claiming violations of the
Constitution,16 9 fee-shifting in establishment cases has prevented
Establishment Clause issues from coming before the courts.1 70 Therefore,
the equality promoted by PERA is more consistent with the spirit of §
1988 than the current practice of awarding attorney's fees in
Establishment Clause cases."'
IV. CONCLUSION
The Public Expression of Religion Act seeks to amend the civil rights
fee-shifting statute to eliminate Establishment Clause cases from its
purview. This amendment is necessary to provide both plaintiffs and
defendants real access to the courts in an area of disagreement and
confusion. Without PERA, supporters of public expressions of religion
are often forced to settle because of fears of expensive litigation. This
results in an imbalance in Establishment Clause cases-those who
oppose public expressions of religion have every incentive to sue, while
their opponents find their position economically untenable.
While opponents of PERA argue that it will inhibit Establishment
Clause claims, this is not true. Plaintiffs will still be free to seek
injunctive or declaratory relief for unconstitutional establishments of
religion, and PERA will have no effect on Free Exercise Clause or other
civil rights cases. Rather than "rolling back" civil rights legislation, as its
opponents claim, PERA would promote greater access to courts for all
parties.

168. See 152 CONG. REC. H7357 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Gingrey)
(explaining that many defendants such as cities or counties "decide[] to settle without
challenging the frivolous accusations not because they could not win but because they
cannot match the challenger's legal war chest"); see also supra note 70.
169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
171. 152 CONG. REC. H7362 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hostettler)
("[PERA] would simply allow [expression cases] to go to court, do not allow that sword of
Damocles, that notion of intimidation to continue and let the case[s] go to court.").

